Now
that a politically survivable solution has been accepted to end the current
conflict in Afghanistan, the discussion of COIN (Counter Insurgency ) doctrinal
viability has begun. Even though the debate
over this doctrine has raged since it's inception, this last ten year ordeal is
forcing the visionaries and philosophes to re-engage in the discussion of
strategy.
On
June 5th, Stratfor issued a prequel to what promises to be a long, arduous, soul searching event
where the differences between one view point and another will be measured perceptions
established after gleaning after action reports and US foreign policy
philosophy. While AA reports and Foreign
Policy statements reveal information relevant to understanding the outcome of
specific engagements, neither after action reports nor the political
establishment's vision will answer why the overall strategy succeeded or failed. In order for there to be any substantive
knowledge gained from these discussions, those involved will have to look a lot
further back to find the real reasons the desired outcome may not have been achieved.
Revisiting
those original meetings and discussions that filled out the analysis that was
used to write the Op Order and plan the strategy will require honest
introspection. It is absolutely vital that those involved in
these post operation discussions be as transparent and honest about what wasn't
done and what was ignored as they are about what transpired on the battlefield
because this is where the legitimate answers lie.
Of
course the intent of these following discussions is to determine how best to
engage enemies in the future because it is becoming more apparent by the day
that our involvement in this region of the world is far from over.
It
is almost ironic that Stratfor should break ground for these discussions on
this day because the same morning, the Syrian government expelled all Western diplomats. This move would normally be seen as just another
step in a third world diplomatic process that is replete with these kinds of
retaliatory acts had the United States, Britain, Canada, Australia,
France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Bulgaria and the Netherlands not already
expelled Syrian diplomats several days earlier.
Western nations have been trying to decide what course of action to take
to staunch the bleeding in this latest chapter in the saga of the Arab Spring
while simultaneously trying to convince the Syrian government and their
President Bashar Al-Assad to, essentially, surrender.
My question remains the same; why do we care? In every single similar episode in this Arab
Spring "adventure", the combatants have had a shared ideology, shared
culture and have been just as brutal to their fellows as the opposition.
Neither side has any particular love for the non-conforming, infidel western
world. The outcome of these poor excuses for elections has certainly not lived
up to the hopes and expectations of the cheering section on this side of the big
pond and one would argue has done little more than energize a people already
belligerent to our very right to exist.
Given our incredibly poor batting average to date, why do we insist on
supporting one side or the other when in reality, they are the same?
What is certain in Syria is that Al-Assad is unlikely to
bend to the whims of the largely western infidel hand-wringers and, the rebel
force facing off with Al-Assad's military is unlikely to back down. This leaves the western diplomatic visionaries
with few options and if a military strike is chosen, the likelihood of an air
offensive a-la-Libya only, is slim. This
suggests the possibility of our witnessing US and Western forces making yet one
more incursion into one more predominant Islamic nation.
Not likely you say?
When we were looking at Libya, many believed "reason would
prevail" and our visionaries would simply sit back and advise. They didn't
and I don't believe there is anyone left who truly believes Libya will have
improved their vision of the infidel world or that Libyans are likely to lead a
better life because of the revolt or our support of it. Remember the desecration
of British World War II graves?
Does someone really want to defend that act as the reasonable response
to the unintentional burning of books?
Is this how normal, moral, peaceful, recently freed people respond to
those who helped them?
At this stage in history, the prospect of sending more US
troops into yet another Islamic regime operating within the same COIN paradigm
should give pause to every red blooded American. If anything has been proven to date it is
that the proponents of COIN are far more interested in the success of their
vision than they are the outcome of combat action.
America's War Fighters deserve better than that! They are trained not simply to follow orders
but to apply the skill and tenacity infused in their very being by years of
very specific training intended to allow them to deliver victory to the nation
they are serving!
COIN does not envision victory. COIN envisions low kinetic
peacekeeping operations in the midst of a "reasonable people" beset
by an outside, unwanted, destructive asymmetric force that neither the
reasonable people nor their government can dislodge without help. It is not much different than the way law
enforcement operates in bad sections of town overrun by gang violence. However, unlike these domestic law enforcement
operations, conducting operations within the sovereign space of another nation creates
a tension between the general population and the foreign counter insurgency
force in the best of situations. Infidel
western forces working in the midst of an overwhelming Islamic culture however
is far from ideal and the likelihood of confrontation is a given; and this is
where the COIN proponents failed.
Absolutely no consideration was given to the probability of unresolvable
tension between the people of Afghanistan and ISAF's largely western,
non-Islamic force due to the doctrines of Islam and the dedication of it's
adherents.
To date there has been absolutely nothing to suggest that
either the politicians in this country or the martial architects of either the
Iraq or Afghan campaigns have been willing to revisit their conscious and
politically motivated decision to ignore the "elephant in the battle space";
the Islamic religion.
In a world that has no stomach for conflict, those entrusted
with the safety and security of nations have decided that big wars are avoided
by smaller wars which are essentially best handled without fighting per COIN
doctrine. In this brave new world, the
Small Wars Manual of 1940 is not just another tool in the magic bag of war
planners it has become the holy grail of conflict resolution.
COIN isn't going anywhere and our War Fighting community
will have to come to accept that the heady days of vanquishing the enemy, his
capability, his morale, his will to fight and forcing him to take a knee are
relinquished to old dusty volumes sitting atop rotting stacks in forgotten
libraries.
Such is the "vision" of our morally bankrupt Politicians
and their General Grade minions.
Semper Fidelis;
John Bernard
